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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure--No FOURTH AMENDMENT
IMPLICATIONS RAISED BY THE MONITORING OF AN ELECTRONIC
TRACKING DEVICE INSTALLED IN A CAR TRAVELING ONTO PRIVATE
PROPERTY FROM A PUBLIC ROADWAY--Unied SlateS v. KnotS, 103 S. Ct.
1081 (1983).
The right of persons to be free from unreasonable search and seizure is
one of the most important rights under the Constitution. Historically,
the Framers felt that the fourth amendment' would protect United
States citizens from the various abuses to which they were subjected
under the English system. 2 Although "the Framers were men who fo-
cused on the wrongs of that day. . .[they] intended the Fourth Amend-
ment to safeguard fundamental values which would far outlast the
specific abuses which gave it birth."3 The fourth amendment confers "as
against the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."
4
As technology has progressed, law enforcement agencies have made
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment states in full:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to seized.
Id
2. An early commentator stated:
This provision [the fourth amendment] seems indispensible to the full enjoyment
of the rights of personal security, personal liberty, and private property. It is
little more than the affirmance of a great constitutional doctrine of the common
law. And its introduction into the amendments was doubtless occasioned by the
strong sensibility excited, both in England and America, upon the subject of
general warrants almost upon the eve of the American Revolution. Although
special warrants upon complaints under oath, stating the crime, and the party
by name, against whom the accusation is made, are the only legal warrants,
upon which an arrest can be made according to the law of England; yet a prac-
tice had obtained in the secretaries' office ever since the restoration, (grounded
on some clauses in the acts for regulating the press) of issuing general warrants to
take up, without naming any persons in particular, the authors, printers, and
publishers of such obscene, or seditious libels, as were particularly specified in
the warrant. When these acts expired, in 1694, the same practice was continued
in every reign, and under every administration, except the last four years of
Queen Anne's reign, down to the year 1763. The general warrants, so issued, in
general terms authorized the officers to apprehend all persons suspected, without
naming, or describing any person in special.
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 709-10 (Bos-
ton 1833).
3. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
4. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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increasing use of electronic devices in conducting investigations.5 While
use of these electronic devices has improved the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of law enforcement, their use has posed serious threats to fourth
amendment values.6 Consequently, courts are faced with the legal ques-
tion of whether the use of electronic devices by the government consti-
tutes a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The use of
electronic devices constitutes a "search" when it intrudes upon a person's
"legitimate expectations of privacy." 7 Determining whether a person's
expectation of privacy is "legitimate" presents the courts with the philo-
sophical question of whether the constitutional protections of privacy
must or should diminish with technological innovations in surveillance.8
The circuit courts' answers to these questions have been disparate. 9
5. See Case Comment, Electronic Tracking Devices And The Fourth Amendment-United
States v. Michael, 16 GA. L. REV. 197, 197 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Case Comment,
Electronic Tracking]. See generally Note, Anthropotelemetiy." Dr. Shwitzgebel's Machine, 80
HARV. L. REV. 403 (1966); Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment,
86 YALE L.J. 1461 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Tracking Katz]; Recent Developments,
Does Installation of an Electronic Tracking Device Constitute a Search Subject to the Fourth Amend-
ment?, 22 VILL. L. REv. 1067 (1977).
6. See Note, Tracking Katz, supra note 5, at 1461. One author asserted:
[T]he police engage in a vast range of activities affecting a broad spectrum of
citizens' interests in a complex variety of ways. If we were to start from scratch
in defining and regulating police practices with a due regard for those citizens'
interests, we would want first to decide what powers should be given to the police
and then to limit each power according to its nature, to the interests it poten-
tially affects, and to the abuses foreseeable in its exercise. But a very large part
of the activities of the police are not specifically authorized by law; the activities
are simply conducted by the police in the discharge of their broad general duties
to enforce the law and keep the peace. Legislative and executive limitation of
the practices has been 'minor to the point of non-existence.' The consequence
has been not only that the fourth amendment has been flung into the breach but
that the Supreme Court is strongly cautioned to keep its contours fluid, so as to
maintain extensibility over the unexpected. In simpler terms, the Court never
knows what the police will come up with next. In recent years, of course, rapid
technological advances and the consequent recognition of the 'frightening para-
phernalia which the vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit upon human
society' have underlined the possibility of worse horrors yet to come.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 386 (1974).
7. Cf Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) ("This Court uniformly has held
that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking
its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy'
that has been invaded by government action.").
8. See United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 517 (1981), rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 1081,
1083 (1983); United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1196 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
847 (1979).
9. For a discussion of the conflicts among the circuits with regard to the fourth
amendment implications raised by the government's use of beepers in investigations, see
Marks & Bately, Electronic Tracking Devices.. Fourth Amendment Problems and Solutions, 67 Ky.
L.J. 987, 990-97 (1978); Case Comment, Finders Keepers, Beepers Weepers.- United States v.
Knotts--A Reahstic Approach to Beeper Use and the Fourth Amendment, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 483,
483-97 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Case Comment, Finders Keepers]; Case Comment, Elec-
tronic Tracking, supra note 5, at 200-13.
[Vol. 10
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The circuits have developed their own approaches for determining
whether installation and subsequent monitoring of an electronic tracking
device, commonly known as a beeper, 10 violates the fourth amendment.
The Ninth Circuit has held that under most circumstances installing and
monitoring beepers has no fourth amendment implications."1 Con-
versely, the Fifth Circuit has held that the use of beepers incurs the full
extent of fourth amendment protection.12 Other courts have found
themselves between these two extremes.'
3
With this uncertainty and confusion among the circuits, the Supreme
Court recently examined for the first time the fourth amendment impli-
cations raised by the use of a beeper.14 In United States v. Knolls, 15 the
Court held that the monitoring of a beeper to ascertain the arrival of a
car from a public roadway onto private property did not constitute a
10. A beeper is a small, battery powered radio transmitter which broadcasts recurrent
signals at a set frequency to reveal location and movement. It is placed on, or in, vehicles
and packages to allow tracing and movement through public and private areas for long
distances and extended periods of time with reduced chances of discovery. See Carr, "Elec-
tronic Beepers," 4 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 1 (April 1977); Note, Tracking Katz, supra
note 5, at 1461. Should the trail ever be lost, the beeper may still enable recovery of it.
Carr, supra, at 1. Since beepers neither transmit speech nor intercept communications,
they are not a wiretap under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act. See J.
CREAMER, THE LAw OF ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 50 (1980); Carr, supra, at 1.
11. See United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976).
12. See United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1975), afden banc by an
equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976).
13. A number of courts permit warrantless use of beepers under certain circum-
stances. See United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), vacating United States v.
Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1976) (no warrant re-
quired where there is probable cause); United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981) (no warrant required where there is reasonable suspicion
to believe crime has been committed).
14. United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983). It is interesting to note that prior
to Knotts, the Supreme Court had denied certiorari to several other cases challenging the
constitutionality of electronic beeper surveillance. The Court issued only memorandum
decisions in Michael v. United States, 622 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g en banc, 645 F.2d
253 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); Houlihan v. Texas, 551 S.W.2d 719 (Tex.
Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 955 (1977); United States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 956 (1977); and United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976).
The Court rendered an opinion in its denial of an application for a stay pending
disposition of a petition for certiorari in Miroyan v. United States, 577 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896, applicationfor stay pending disposition ofpetitionfor certiorari denied, 439
U.S. 1338 (1978). In Mfiroyan, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions of co-defendants
for drug-related offenses. Evidence supporting the convictions had been gathered by
means of a beeper attached to an airplane traveling between the United States and Mex-
ico. Both the installation of the beeper and its subsequent monitoring were challenged.
577 F.2d at 492. The beeper had been attached to an aircraft with its owner's consent and
later rented by the co-defendants for illicit purposes. The Ninth Circuit ruled that it did
not need to consider the issue of whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion justified
3
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search.16 The Court did not pass on the constitutionality of the beeper's
installation. 17
Leroy Knotts was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture controlled
substances. I8 Suspicion was first aroused when the 3M Company noti-
fied the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension that a former em-
ployee, Triston Armstrong, had stolen chemicals from 3M which could
be used to manufacture illegal drugs.' 9 After he left his employment
with 3M, Armstrong began purchasing similar chemicals from the Haw-
kins Chemical Company. Investigators, using visual surveillance, discov-
ered that Armstrong purchased chemicals and delivered them to Darryl
Petschen. 20
Narcotics officers received permission from the Hawkins Chemical
Company to install an electronic beeper inside a five gallon container of
chloroform. 2 t The container was sold to Armstrong. After the sale, nar-
cotics officers followed the car in which Armstrong had placed the chlo-
roform, using visual surveillance and monitoring the signals sent by the
beeper.22 Armstrong proceeded to Petschen's house, where the container
was transferred to Petschen's car. Narcotics officers maintained visual
and electronic surveillance as Petschen traveled eastward across the Min-
nesota border into Wisconsin. During the trip, Petschen made "evasive
maneuvers," ending the officers' visual surveillance.23 The officers tem-
porarily lost the signal from the beeper, but with the assistance of a mon-
itoring device located in a helicopter, picked it up again. When the
signal was picked up, its stationary location was a cabin occupied by
the installation and tracking since the consent of the owner provided adequate justifica-
tion. Id at 429-39.
The Supreme Court found no "square conflict" among the circuit courts that would
justify granting certiorari and denied Miroyan's petition on that basis. Miroyan, 439 U.S.
at 1339. In the eyes of the Court, Miroyan was consistent with the third-party consent
exception to the warrant requirement developed by the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Cheshire, 569 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1978), and United States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 956 (1977). See 439 U.S. at 1342. Also, since there was no treatment
of the issue of probable cause in Miroyan, the Court stated that there was no disagreement
between the Ninth and First Circuits. Id. at 1343. In United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d
106 (1st Cir. 1976), the First Circuit held that probable cause was required to justify a
warrantless beeper installation.
15. 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
16. Id at 1087.
17. See id at 1084 n.**; zrnfa note 29.
18. Knotts was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 846. He was charged along with
two co-defendants, Darryl Petschen and Triston Armstrong. Petschen was jointly tried
and convicted with Knotts in district court. Armstrong pled guilty and testified for the
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Knotts in a secluded area of Wisconsin.24 After three days of intermit-
tent visual surveillance, the officers secured a search warrant and discov-
ered a fully operable clandestine drug laboratory in the cabin. The
chloroform containing the beeper was located outside the cabin under a
barrel. 2
5
At trial, Knotts moved to suppress the seized evidence, alleging that
the monitoring of the beeper signals constituted an illegal search. His
motion was denied. 26 Knotts' district court conviction27 was reversed by
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals which held that the monitoring of
the beeper constituted an illegal search.2 8 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address whether the monitoring of the signal constituted a
search.
29
24. Id. at 1084.
25. Id
26. Id
27. Id Co-defendant Petschen was also found guilty in District Court. Triston Arm-
strong had pled guilty and testified for the government. Id at 1083.
28. Id. at 1084. Petschen's conviction was not overturned by the Eighth Circuit.
United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 518 (1981), cert. denied sub nom. Petschen v. United
States, 102 S. Ct. 2964 (1982).
29. Knolls, 103 S. Ct. at 1084. Fourth amendment issues are raised by the initial
installation of a beeper in addition to monitoring of the beeper signal. See 1 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.7, at 418 (1978). A recent Fifth Circuit case acknowledged that
Knolls "clarified the present state of 'beeper jurisprudence' " in that "the Knolls Court
employed a bifurcated analytical framework for examining the Fourth Amendment impli-
cations of beeper use, separating the installation or attachment of the tracking device from
the monitoring of its signals." United States v. Butts, No. 82-1260 (5th Cir. Aug. 1, 1983).
Although the Knolls Court may have recognized installation and monitoring as two dis-
tinct questions, it did not address the fourth amendment issues raised by the installation of
the beeper. 103 S. Ct. at 1084 n**. Counsel for Knotts did not challenge the warrantless
installation of the beeper, suggesting in oral argument that his client did not have stand-
ing to raise the installation issue. Id
The Court's failure to address the installation issue means confusion will remain
among the circuits with regard to the fourth amendment implications raised by the initial
installation of a beeper. Virtually all the electronic tracking device cases that have come
before the courts have involved beepers installed without a warrant. But cf. United States
v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980) (installation and monitoring of beeper were uncon-
stitutional because warrant failed to include termination date); United States v. Pretz-
inger, 542 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1976) (warrant was obtained prior to installation of
beeper; court said warrant was unnecessary).
Where the installation has been accomplished without a warrant, the resolution of
the fourth amendment issues turns on whether there are sufficient grounds to justify the
warrantless attachment. The First Circuit recognized an automobile exception in United
States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111-12 (1st Cir. 1977). The existence of probable cause for
government agents to believe that an offense has or is about to be committed was held to
be adequate justification for a warrantless installation. Id at 113. The Eighth Circuit
addressed this issue in United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1976). The court
held that "exigent circumstances" were sufficient to justify the minimal intrusion into the
defendant's fourth amendment rights occasioned by the installation of a "bumper
beeper." Id at 1325. Two years after Frazier, the Tenth Circuit held in United States v.
Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. dented, 440 U.S. 908 (1979), that probable
19841
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The Supreme Court in Knolls applied the reasonable expectation of
privacy test to determine whether the monitoring of the beeper consti-
tuted a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 30 The test
developed out of the Court's decision in Katz v. UntedStates. 31 Tradition-
ally, the Supreme Court's analysis of fourth amendment search and
seizure issues has focused upon whether the government committed an
actual physical trespass. 32 The validity of searches and seizures by elec-
cause and exigent circumstances supported the warrantless installation of a beeper used to
track an automobile. Finally, in United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981),
the Fifth Circuit held that mere reasonable suspicion, a less stringent standard than prob-
able cause, was sufficient to support the warrantless installation of a beeper in a rental
van.
Another context in which fourth amendment issues are raised with regard to installa-
tion of the beeper involves the effect of an owner's consent to the warrantless installation.
Typically, this circumstance arises when a defendant derivatively comes into possession of
a bugged object. A so-called third-party consent requirement was employed in United
States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 956 (1977). This Fifth Circuit
case involved the warrantless installation of an electronic tracking device in an airplane
which was piloted between the Bahamas and Florida. Since the beeper had been placed
on the plane with the owner's express consent, the court upheld the constitutionality of the
attachment. 548 F.2d at 592. Treatment of this issue by the other circuits has varied. In
a case similar to Abel, the Ninth Circuit used a two-part analysis that contrasted the con-
stitutional significance of monitoring the signal. United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489,
492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978). Moreover, when the Eighth Circuit ad-
dressed the third-party consent rule in Knolls, it implied that the rule might be predicated
upon the contractual theory of caveat emptor. See Knolls, 662 F.2d at 517 n.2. Caveat
emptor is translated as "let the buyer beware." It is a common law maxim expressing the
rule that the "buyer purchases at his peril." BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 183 (3d ed.
1969). The Supreme Court in Knolls did not allude to the Eighth Circuit's caveat emptor
argument. Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, remained unconvinced that the court of
appeals' footnote effectively disposed of the installation issue. "The Government is not
here defending against a claim for damages in an action for breach of warranty; it is
attempting to justify the legality of a search conducted in the course of a criminal investi-
gation." Knolls, 103 S. Ct. at 1088 (Brennan, J., concurring). Most recently, the Tenth
Circuit held:
The consent of one owner to leave a beeper installed cannot suffice to continue
the installation once the item belongs to someone else anymore than the consent
of a previous owner of a suitcase could suffice to permit the police to periodically
open and search a suitcase after it comes under the ownership of another.
United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1438-39 (10th Cir. 1983).
30. Knolls, 103 S. Ct. at 1085.
31. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
32. In the early years of electronic surveillance, the warrantless use of an electronic
device to eavesdrop was permitted if no physical trespass was committed. See Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (no fourth amendment violation resulting from wire-
taps when government agents did not actually enter defendants' residences to perform
wiretap); Case Comment, Electronic Tracking, supra note 5, at 197. Olmstead set the stage for
a line of cases from which the concept of a constitutionally protected area subject to fourth
amendment protections evolved. See id at 198; see, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961) (penetration of "spike mike" through party's wall held to be unconstitu-
tional search because of trespassory physical entry); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942) (listening device placed against partition and used to monitor conversation in
[Vol. 10
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tronic surveillance was determined by reference to property rights. The
Katz decision shifted the analytical emphasis from property-based analy-
sis to an analysis of the individual's expectations of privacy.33 The Katz
Court articulated the following rule: "[W]hat a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected." 34 Under this rule, use of electronic surveillance constitutes a
search when it discloses matters which a person "justifiably" regards as
private. 3
5
The reasonable expectation of privacy test used by the Knolls Court
was drawn from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz. 36 Harlan's
concurrence was an attempt to limit the majority's departure from prece-
dent and to inject personal intentions and social norms into the determi-
nation of fourth amendment protection.37 The test developed from
Harlan's opinion involves a twofold requirement. Before fourth amend-
ment protection will be afforded, it must be established "that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' "38
next room held not to violate fourth amendment because no trespass occurred at time
conversations were overheard).
33. In Katz, government agents attached an electronic listening device to the outside
of a public telephone booth without obtaining a warrant. They listened to and recorded
defendant Katz's calls. Those calls were introduced at his trial. He was charged with
transmitting wagering information. Katz contended that the recordings had been ob-
tained in violation of his fourth amendment rights. 389 U.S. at 348. Katz argued that the
booth from which he placed his calls was a constitutionally protected area; the govern-
ment maintained that it was not. Id. at 351. The Supreme Court rejected the parties'
formulation of the issues. TheKatz Court stated: "[T]his effort to decide whether or not a
given 'area,' viewed in the abstract, is 'constitutionally protected' deflects attention from
the problem presented by this case. For the fourth amendment protects people, not
places." Id The Court extended fourth amendment protection because "[t]he Govern-
ment's activities in electronically listening to and recording [Katz's] words violated the
privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth .... ." Id at
353. According to the Court, one who occupies a telephone booth "shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the
words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world." Id at 352.
34. Id at 350-51.
35. See id. at 353.
36. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
37. Note, Trackting Katz, supra note 5, at 1471.
38. Katz, 389 U.S. at 369 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In a footnote in Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128 (1978), the Supreme Court provided an illustration of the test's application:
Obviously ...a 'legitimate' expectation of privacy by definition means more
than a subjective expectation of not being discovered. A burglar plying his trade
in a summer cabin during the off season may have a thoroughly justified subjec-
tive expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognized as 'legiti-
mate.' [The burglar's] . ..presence is wrongful; his expectation is not one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'
1984]
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Applying this test, the Knotts Court drew a distinction between a per-
son's expectation of privacy in the movements and location of an auto-
mobile on a public roadway and the expectation of privacy within a
dwelling. 39 The Court acknowledged that Knotts, as the owner of the
cabin, "undoubtedly had the traditional expectation of privacy within
his dwelling insofar as the cabin was concerned."40 Conversely, the
Court noted, "A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It
travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents
are in plain view."' 4 Petschen's exit from public roadways onto Knotts'
property was openly visible to the public. 42 Thus, Knotts had no reason-
able expectation that the arrival of Petschen onto his property was a
private matter.
43
Knotts did not object to this analysis.44 Rather, he argued that the
electronic monitoring involved more than merely ascertaining the arrival
of Petschen's vehicle onto his property.4 5 The circuit court had agreed
with Knotts. According to the court of appeals, Knotts' cabin "was not
found by watching or tracing the public progress of Petschen in his
car."46 The government agents lost sight of Petschen.47 They also lost
the signal being transmitted by the beeper.48 When the agents were
again able to monitor the signal, the canister containing the beeper was
stationary, on Knotts' property,49 and out of public view.50 Monitoring
of the beeper was thus held to have invaded Knotts' legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy "in the kind and location of objects out of view on his
land." 5 '
The Supreme Court was unpersuaded by Knotts' argument and the
lower court's reasoning.52 The Court viewed the argument as a revival of
the fourth amendment analysis applied in pre-Katz search and seizure
cases, which defined a search as a physical trespass into constitutionally
protected areas. Knotts' expectation of privacy alone was deemed dis-
positive of the fourth amendment issue. The Court stressed the "limited
Id at 143 n.12.
39. See Knotts, 103 S. Ct. at 1085.
40. Id
41. Id (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)).
42. See id
43. See id
44. See Brief for Respondent at 18, United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
45. See id
46. United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 518 (1981), rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 1081
(1983).
47. Knotts, 662 F.2d at 516.
48. Id
49. Id
50. Id at 518.
51. Id
52. See Knous, 103 S. Ct. at 1087.
[Vol. 10
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use" that the government agents made of the signals from the beeper.53
The Court noted that nothing in the record showed reliance on the
beeper after the signal indicated the chloroform container had ended its
automotive journey on Knotts' property.54 Apparently, the record re-
flected that the beeper was not used to determine the precise location of
the chloroform container on Knotts' premises.55 The beeper was used
only to determine that the container was on Knotts' property. 56 This
fact could have been determined by visually observing Petschen entering
Knotts' property with the container in his car. Use of the beeper merely
augmented the government agents' vision. Petschen's arrival on Knotts'
property could have been observed by anyone.57 The Court ultimately
rejected Knotts' argument stating: "Just as notions of physical trespass
based on the law of real property were not dispositive in Katz [wherein
the Court established that the fourth amendment protects people not
places] . . . neither were they dispositive in Hester v. United States
[wherein the Court established the open fields doctrine]."58
53. See id
54. Id
55. This contention was put forth in the government's brief. See Brief for Appellant
at 26, United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
56. See id
57. See id The Supreme Court stated:
When Petschen travelled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to any-
one who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final
destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.
Knolls, 103 S. Ct. at 1085.
58. Knolls, 103 S. Ct. at 1087. The Court stated that "no reasonable expectation of
privacy extended to the visual observation of Petschen's automobile arriving on [Knotts']
premises after leaving a public highway, nor to movements of objects such as the drum of
chloroform outside the cabin in the 'open fields.' " This reference to open fields drew
criticism in two concurring opinions. See, e.g., id at 1087-88 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun asserted that the Knotts case did not con-
cern the open fields doctrine. Id at 1088. He regarded reference to the open fields doc-
trine as unnecessary for the decision. Id According to Blackmun, the most important
cases dealing with the open fields doctrine had already been accepted by the Court for
argument and plenary consideration. Id. (citing Florida v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093 (Fla.
1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2266 (1982); Oliver v. United States, 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir.
1982) (en banc), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 812 (1983)). Blackmun concluded:
It would be unfortunate to provide either side in these granted cases with sup-
port, directly or by implication, for its position, and I surely do not wish to de-
cide those cases in this one. Although the Court does not indicate its view on
how such cases should be decided, I would defer all comments about open fields
to a case that concerns that subject and in which we have the benefit of briefs
and oral argument.
Id at 1088.
The "open fields doctrine" was first enunciated in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S.
57 (1924), where the Court held that fourth amendment protection did extend to open
fields. Id. at 59. The Court in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), began to
retract from its rigid position in Hester. In Olmstead, the Court held that fourth amend-
ment protection was available if the house or curtilage were physically invaded. Id at
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Although it is the first beeper case to be decided by the Supreme
Court, Knolls is by no means a watershed case. Knots produces a narrow
holding based on fine distinctions of fact. The Court first narrowed its
inquiry to the fourth amendment issues raised by the monitoring of the
beeper and did not consider issues raised by the installation of the
beeper. 59 Second, the Court framed the issue in accordance with the
government's position. As noted above, the government's position was
that the use of a beeper to assist in surveillance of a motor vehicle travel-
ing on public roadways was at issue.60 On the other hand, Knotts con-
tended that the issue before the Court involved monitoring of a
noncontraband item on private property out of public view.6 1 Having
adopted the government's position, the Court had little trouble resolving
the case. It is difficult to refute that one could not reasonably expect his
movements on public roadways to remain private.62
Knolls thus established that electronic monitoring of movement on a
public roadway does not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy.63
466. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court stated that "what [a person]
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitution-
ally protected." Id at 351-52. Since Katz, some courts have applied a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test to the open fields doctrine, further limiting the rigid rule enunciated in
Hester. See Comment, Katz In Open Fields, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 485, 485 (1983).
Since courts have not uniformly applied Katz to the open fields doctrine Blackmun's
admonishment becomes all the more apparent. It is necessary for the Court to reconcile
confusion only after the issue is properly before the Court. For an excellent discussion of
the disparate effect Katz has had on the open fields doctrine, see id
59. Knotis, 103 S. Ct. at 1084 & n.*4 '.
60. See Brief for Appellant at 21-24, United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
61. See Brief for Respondent at 18, United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
62. Other courts have ruled that people who commit acts in public, such as flying and
driving, may be monitored because they have no reasonable expectation of privacy from
visual surveillance. See United States v. Michael, 622 F.2d 744 (5th Cir.), reh'g en bane, 645
F.2d 252, 257-58 (5th Cir.) (diminished expectation of privacy when travelling in auto on
public roads), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190,
1196-97 (8th Cir.) (no legitimate expectation of privacy while traveling in public air
space), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir.)
(no reasonable expectation of privacy in drums of caffeine hauled over public roads), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976). But see United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 864 (5th Cir.
1975) (person does not necessarily lose his expectation of privacy while in public) reh'g en
bane, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); Note, Tracking Katz, supra note 5, at 1994. One com-
mentator has stated:
A traveler in public may be seen by many people, and his location at any given
point may be known. It is also possible that reasonably curious persons might
follow him for relatively brief periods and short distances. But continuous tail-
ing by one person for a long distance or time is unlikely. An individual may thus
be entitled to rely on the privacy of his "route," even if segments of it are ex-
posed. When a beeper is used to track an individual's route by continuous and
lengthy monitoring, the individual's privacy may thus be invaded though he
took no apparent steps to protect it.
Id
63. See Knottr, 103 S. Ct. at 1085-86.
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On the other hand, the Supreme Court acknowledged that one has the
traditional expectation of privacy in his dwelling.64 By implication,
Knolls stands for the premise that monitoring of an item in a person's
dwelling would constitute an invasion of that person's reasonable expec-
tation of privacy.
65
Knolls will do little to clarify recurring conflicts among the circuits
with regard to fourth amendment implications raised by the use of elec-
tronic tracking devices. Confusion will persist because Knolls merely
joins the precedent of resolving fourth amendment issues with the reason-
able expectation of privacy test.6 6 The courts have consistently applied
the same test, but the focus of the inquiry whether a person has a reason-
able expectation of privacy has varied among them. In Knolls, the focus
was on the location of the item containing the beeper.6 7 Other courts
have focused on the nature of the item containing the beeper. 68 Under
this approach, a person does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in a piece of property to which he is not entitled possession.69 Such prop-
64. Id at 1085.
65. See id
66. The test to determine reasonableness is whether society is prepared to recognize a
person's movements on public roads as reasonable. This test is relativistic. It would be
difficult to determine empirically that which society would recognize as reasonable. One
commentator stated:
Courts must draw inferences from social practices, and they must assess the so-
cial functions served by specific privacy interests. From these general evalua-
tions they must then determine where, in specific instances, to draw the line
beyond which a warrant is required.
Two kinds of privacy interests are likely to be deemed reasonable: those that are
commonly asserted, and those that, though less frequently claimed, nevertheless
play a significant role in the social order. Both the prevalence and the impor-
tance of privacy interests, however, are inevitably matters of degree. Thus, the
'reasonable expectation' standard compels courts to decide the degree of social
solidarity or significance sufficient to raise a Fourth Amendment claim. For this
decision, the test applies no objective referent. Instead, courts tend to weigh
particular privacy interests against other values, such as the need for effective
law enforcement. The weights assigned to each competing value ultimately de-
pend upon the judges' own principles and priorities.
Note, Tracking Katz, supra note 5, at 1473-74.
67. The Supreme Court stated in Knolls: "The governmental surveillance conducted
by means of the beeper in this case amounted principally to the following of an automo-
bile on public streets and highways." 103 S. Ct. at 1085.
68. See United States v. Pringle, 576 F.2d 1114-19 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st. Cir. 1977),cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v.
Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976); United States v. Em-
ery, 541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1976).
69. See United States v. Pringle, 576 F.2d 1114, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1978) (insertion of
beeper into package of mail containing heroin and subsequent monitoring did not consti-
tute a search); United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 890 (1st Cir. 1976) (beeper inserted
in bag of cocaine and tracked to defendant's apartment did not violate defendant's reason-
able expectation of privacy); United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 846 (1976) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when undercover agents barter
television equipped with beeper in exchange for heroin); United States v. French, 414 F.
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erty may be monitored regardless of its location without being consid-
ered a search under the fourth amendment. 70 The Ninth and Tenth
Circuits have taken yet another approach to the legitimate expectation
of privacy issue. Their approach has focused on the single intrusion that
a beeper makes irrespective of location or nature of the item. 7 1 The
Tenth Circuit has held that the slight intrusion of a beeper does not con-
stitute an impressionable search.
72
The reasonable expectation of privacy test has little prescriptive value.
It is likely that courts will continue to take divergent paths in framing
and resolving fourth amendment issues raised by the use of beepers. By
reaffirming the use of this test, 73 the Knolls Court did little to resolve
confusion among the circuits.
Additionally, Knolls leaves unanswered questions involving the fourth
amendment implications raised by the initial installation of the beeper.
74
In addressing only the fourth amendment issues raised by monitoring of
the beeper, the Court left unresolved the grounds sufficient to justify war-
rantless installation of a beeper and the requirements for standing to
challenge installation.75 In those situations where monitoring of a beeper
has constituted a search, there remains the open question of what must
be done or what circumstances must be present to satisfy the fourth
amendment standard of reasonableness.
As long as the use of electronic surveillance by law enforcement agen-
cies continues, criminal appeals challenging beeper installation and mon-
itoring will continue. The Court will no doubt soon be called upon to
Supp. 800 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (beeper placed on packages of marijuana violated no reason-
able expectation of privacy).
70. No one can have a "legitimate expectation of privacy in substances which they
have no right to possess at all." United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1977).
71. See United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346, 350-51 (10th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 860-61 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Dubrofski, 581
F.2d 208, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1978). In Clayborne, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant's
conviction of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance. The court held that a
slight intrusion resulting from a warrantless placement of an electronic tracking device in
a container of ether, which resulted in locating a laboratory in a commercial building, was
not per se a violation of the fourth amendment. See Clayborne, 584 F.2d at 350-51. The
court stated: "The use of the beeper with a laboratory was vastly different from the use of
the recording device in the telephone booth in Katz. The invasion in Katz was of great
magnitude in comparison with the intrusion here (a beeper)." Id.
72. See supra note 71.
73. At least two commentators have suggested alternative approaches to the reason-
able expectation of privacy test in determining the fourth amendment implications raised
by the use of beepers. See Note, Tracking Katz, supra note 5, at 1477-96 (advocating return
to standards articulated by majority in Katz in fourth amendment privacy analysis); Case
Comment, Finders Keepers, supra note 9, at 501-06.
74. The Knotts Court stated: "We note that while several Courts of Appeals have
approved warrantless installation we have not before and do not now pass on the issue."
103 S. Ct. at 1084 n** (citations omitted).
75. See supra note 29.
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resolve the questions left unanswered in Knolls and will again have to
confront the inconsistencies and confusion fostered by the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test. Knolls will not provide much guidance.
Constitutional Law-FIRST AMENDMENT OVERRIDES MUNICIPAL AT-
TEMPT TO ZONE ADULT BOOKSTORES AND THEATERS-Alexander v. Ciy
of Minneapoh's, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983).
In recent years several municipalities have attempted to prevent com-
munity deterioration by enacting zoning ordinances designed to restrict
the location of adult bookstores and theaters., Government interest in
controlling crime and preventing property devaluation2 often has
clashed with the right to distribute non-obscene sexually oriented mate-
rial.3 To survive constitutional scrutiny, a zoning ordinance which cur-
tails public access to adult entertainment must be narrowly drawn and
further a substantial and compelling governmental interest. If the ordi-
nance imposes any content limitations on the purveyors of adult en-
tertainment, or if it restricts the public's right to patronize such
entertainment in any significant way, it will be found unconstitutional.4
1. See Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1980); Hart Book Stores v.
Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980); Kacar, Inc. v.
Zoning Hearing Bd. of Allentown, 60 Pa. Commw. 582, 432 A.2d 310 (1981); Northend
Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978) (en banc).
2. In Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated an ordinance which in effect allowed adult theaters
to operate only in areas of zones for light and heavy industry. These areas included
swamps, warehouses, and railroad tracks. Id at 1209. In Keego Harbor Co. v. City of
Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981), the city enacted an ordinance which prohib-
ited the placement of an adult theater within 500 feet of an establishment licensed to sell
liquor, a church or a school, or within 250 feet of a residential zone. The owner of the only
adult bookstore in the city was prohibited from doing business because no location existed
which was not within 500 feet of the theater. Id at 96. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
struck down the ordinance. Id at 98. "Keego Harbor does not merely disperse adult
theatres within its jurisdiction but effectively bans them." Id.
3. A leading constitutional law scholar has written, "Any government action aimed
at communicative impact is presumptively at odds with the first amendment. For if the
constitutional guarantee means anything, it means that, ordinarily at least, 'government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content .... .' L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 581 (1978)
(quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). The government
must have a valid justification for enacting an ordinance which would have an impact on
protected communication such as nonobscene adult entertainment.
4. See Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). The court inSchad quoted Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), for the following proposition:
[A] zoning ordinance can withstand constitutional scrutiny only upon a clear
showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and sub-
stantial government interest. . . . [T]he onus of demonstrating that no less in-
trusive means will adequately protect the compelling state interest and that the
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